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Counterterrorism, International Humanitarian Law and Non-International Armed Conflict 
I. Introduction 
 
Terrorism’s long history shows how easily the term falls prey to political manipulation ‘one man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter,’1 and the one who holds the power determines the narrative. Yet it is 
impossible to write a critical paper about counterterrorism without referring to terrorism a multitude of 
times, different definitions that can be envisaged based on previous assumptions, perhaps we are 
speaking of the plurality of ‘terrorisms.’2 Thus, it may be useful to keep the following in mind: 
Terrorism can be understood at a basic level as the public use of violence to inspire 
terror […] The profusion of more narrow definitions that have emerged in the twentieth 
and the twenty first centuries reflect a need to create legal and moral categories that 
delegitimise particular uses of terror in order to justify action against them. These 
definitions of terrorism are fluid and unstable. They depend on who is formulating them, 
what their interests are, and whom they are talking about.3  
It is important to note that despite of the ubiquitous use of the term terrorism, it can be argued that it 
has ‘no legal significance’4 in the absence of a single internationally agreed definition.5 As will be 
established, terrorism is a political construction that is unable to find its place in law, perhaps for very 
good reasons. Putting in question the term of terrorism does not condone acts and/or violence, which 
cause fear through intention or actions. Such acts are unacceptable in peace and in war.  
 
The terrorist label, however, as the construction of the exceptional ‘other,’6 that then is claimed to fall 
out of existing legal regimes, can be politically expedient and counterproductive, especially in war, as it 
further polarises the conflict and makes reconciliation more difficult.7  In spite of this, the international 
                                                 
1 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 18. 
2 As quoted in Ben Saul, 'Definition of Terrorism in the UN Security Council: 1985-2004' (2005) 4 
CHINESE J INT'L L 161.  
3 The definition offered by Brown includes ‘inspire terror in order to influence the actions of third parties.’ 
However, the latter can be also contentious so it was omitted to keep it to the core element. Warren C. 
Brown ‘The Pre-History of Terrorism’ in Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas and Stathis 
N. Kalyvas (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism (Oxford 2019) 87.  
4 Rosalyn Higgins as quoted in Andrea Bianchi ‘Counterterrorism and International Law’ in Erica 
Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas and Stathis N. Kalyvas (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Terrorism (Oxford 2019) 661.  
5 Michael J. Boyle ‘Introduction’ in Michael J. Boyle (ed) Non-Western Responses to terrorism 
(Manchester University Press 2019) 3.  
6 Nicole Detraz, International Security and Gender (Polity Press 2012) 114. 
7 Detraz (n6) 100.  
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community, through conventions and more recently through the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
(SC) Resolutions (UNSCR) acting under Chapter VII, push States to respond, to what some see as an 
exceptional phenomenon,8 with criminalisation of terrorism through domestic legislation. From the 
international perspective, this drive for domestic counterterrorist laws is  deemed necessary to increase 
cooperation among States, deny safe havens and confront the transnational terrorist threat.  9 On the 
domestic level, these laws have been criticised from a human rights perspective for suppressing dissent 
and prioritising security over, for example, the right to privacy or due process and for challenging jus 
cogens principles such as torture.10 Although, the counterterrorist laws are intended to suppress 
transnational terrorist acts committed during times of peace, they usually  apply to domestic acts of 
violence which are increasingly labelled terrorism. Gradually, one can observe the blurring of the lines 
between peace and war, politically if not yet legally. For example, in 2015 the Canadian Prime Minister, 
‘conflated war and crime when he defended a counter-terrorism bill … on the basis that ‘violent Jihadism 
is not a human right, it is an act of war…’ [which] is politically popular, but it ignores…[that] [e]ven in 
war, there are laws.’11 Beyond politics, the domestic legislation could take form of sanctioning a military 
response to counter terrorism.  For example, the US Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) 
approves targeted killings outside of conflict, and maintains that it is consistent with the laws of war.12 
For instance, the UK did not classify the ongoing violence from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during 
the 1970s and 1980s, however it did enact emergency legislation, which some have said had been 
enacted to ‘circumvent the Geneva Conventions and other bodies of humanitarian law regulating 
conduct in war.’13 There may have been multiple reasons why the UK did not wish to declare it an armed 
conflict, one could be to not legitimise the IRA, and by instead labelling them ‘terrorists’ it could justify 
                                                 
8 Carla Ferstman, ‘Human Security and Extraordinary Rendition’ in Alice Edward and Carla Ferstman 
(eds) Human Security and Non-Citizens (Cambridge University Press 2010) 535. 
9 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon explained transnational terrorist threat as: ‘connection of 
perpetrators, victims, or means used across two or more countries, but it may also be significant impact 
that a terrorist act in one country has on another – in other words, when it is foreseeable that a terrorist 
attack that is planned and executed in one country will threaten international peace and security, at 
least for neighbouring countries.’  
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, ‘Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging,’ (16 February 2011) STL-11-01/1 para 90. [From herein 
STL Interlocutory Decision]  
10 The most poignant example of this has been extraordinary rendition and the use of detention and 
treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay in the Global War on Terror. For example, see Duffy (n1)  
11 Kent Roach ‘Thematic Conclusions and Future Challenges’ in Kent Roach ed. Comparative 
Counterterrorism Law (Cambridge University 2015) 740. 
12 Roach (ibid) 738. 
13 Juliana van Hoeven, 'Counter-Terrorism Measures and International Humanitarian Law: A Case 
Study of the Troubles in Northern Ireland' (2016) 37 U PA J INT'L L 1109.  
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its own domestic law to protect national security with special powers and courts ultimately leading to 
many allegations of human rights abuses.14 Outside of conflict, law enforcement and International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL) should apply unless it is replaced by another mechanism, which should be 
consistent with international law.15  The laws of war, as codified in the Geneva Conventions (GC) and 
their Additional Protocols (AP), known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) were developed to 
provide rules on the conduct of hostilities balancing military necessity while safeguarding the minimum 
of humanity, even to one’s enemy, even if considered a ‘terrorist.’  
 
Much has been written about distinguishing the terrorist framework from IHL, first clarifying the law of 
jus ad bellum particularly refuting the concept of the Global War on Terror.16 Then in reasserting that 
IHL is different to terrorism and sufficient to regulate jus in bello in so far as it prohibits and criminalises 
acts of terrorism.17 Less has been written about how States use domestic counterterrorist legislation in 
civil wars, otherwise knowns as Non-international Armed Conflicts (NIAC). One of the reasons for this 
may be the challenge in surrounding the classification of NIACs.  Another may be that IHL in NIAC 
recognised the primacy of State sovereignty and provides a role for domestic legislation to criminalise 
armed opposition groups, which has resulted in asymmetrical rules. Given the increased 
internationalisation of NIACs and the proliferation of counterterrorist legislation this should be re-
examined.   
 
The aim of this paper is to understand how this internationally undefined terrorist label, albeit with a 
counterterrorist framework that inspired the proliferation of domestic counterterrorist laws, intersects 
with IHL and then understand the effect of this relationship on NIAC. As such, the first part will chart the 
main evolution of the international response to terrorism through an overview of conventions, 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Françoise Hampson, F ‘The conduct of hostilities versus the law enforcement paradigm’ in ICRC-
COE Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law 17th Bruges Colloquium 20-
21 October 2016, 47.7 (Collegium, Autumn 2017) Available <www.coe-icrc.eu> 
accessed 20 August 2019, 85. Derogations of certain rights in times of emergencies may be 
permitted, however this should be specific, declared and limited to the necessity of the limitation and 
states cannot derogate from jus cogens rights (ex. freedom from torture) Daragh Murray Practitioners’ 
Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2016) page 59 
16 See for example, Helen Duffy The War on Terror (n1) 
17 See for example, Jelena Pejic ‘Armed Conflict and Terrorism: There is a (Big) Difference’ in Ana-
Maria Salinas de Frias, Katja L.H. Samuel and Nigel D. White (eds.) Counter-terrorism: international 
law and practice (Oxford University Press 2012)  
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resolutions and the accompanied difficulties in coming to consensus on defining terrorism. The second 
part will look at how terrorism is understood in IHL, particularly in NIAC.  The third part will examine, 
through a number of examples, how this counterterrorist framework and the domestic legislations 
interacts with IHL, and understand whether it undermines and/or impedes its application in NIAC.  
 
II. The International Responses to Terrorism: Conventions, Resolutions and  
Domestic Counterterrorist Law 
It is first useful to look at the historical evolution of the international community’s attempts at defining 
terrorism, and its response to terrorist actions through various mechanisms. Debates continue on 
whether there is a universally agreed definition;  meanwhile, sectoral conventions, UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) issued under Chapter VII, and the subsequent domestic counterterrorist 
legislation could be interpreted as forming a counterterrorist normative framework, which is contested 
by some for not adding anything beyond the existing domestic and international law mechanisms.18 In 
spite of the criticism it is clear that States continue to insist on terrorism in ‘their statements and 
increasingly in international instruments.’ 19 As such, it is impossible to deny that there is a normative 
framework, but, it needs to be stressed that it is not a ‘unified field of international law, but comprises 
of disparate norms emanating from multiple sources,’ and as a minimum it aims to ‘establish extensive 
jurisdiction over the offences, and investigate, apprehend and ‘prosecute or extradite offenders.’’20  
 
The following will give an overview of the international community’s historical evolution and main 
developments, and underline points of contention, and analyse its relationship with IHL with the aim to 
determine whether this framework clashes with existing international law or exacerbates some of the 
ongoing debates, before proceeding to identifying and analysing its effects in and on NIAC.   
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Bianchi (n 4) 660.  
19 Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies and Solutions to Problems 
Arising in Warfare, (Elgar 2019) para 10.22. 
20 Ben Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law’ (2016) Sydney Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/37 Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2778893> Last 
accessed 20 August 2019, 8.   
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A. Evolution of the International Response to Terrorism   
One of the earliest attempts at creating an international treaty against terrorism dates back to 1937. 
Following the assassination of the Yugoslavian king and French Foreign Minister, the League of Nations 
proposed a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which would not be adopted 
as States could not agree on terrorism ‘as a means to a political end.’21 Between 1936 and 1981 there 
were 109 different proposed definitions. 22 In spite, of a continuous push for an international instrument 
to criminalise terrorism, there would be an equally consistent resistance. After the Second World War, 
there was concern, especially from the  Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of developing States (this would 
later be taken up by the Organisation of Islamic States (OIC)), that defining terrorism as a political crime 
would criminalise and/or suppress struggles of self-determination opposing colonialism, and insistence 
to include State terrorism in the definition.23 Unable to move forward with a definition for a 
comprehensive convention, the international community started to criminalise acts, such as hostage 
taking and hijacking of planes,  through sectoral conventions.  
 
Overall, since 1963 to date, 19 Conventions including their Protocols were adopted.24 These treaties 
ensured each country could establish jurisdiction over grave transnational acts, and normally excluded 
acts of violence committed domestically.25 Progressively they include clauses to either prosecute or 
                                                 
21 Ben Saul ‘Defining Terrorism’ in Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas and Stathis N. 
Kalyvas (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism (Oxford 2019) 36.  
22 Duffy (n1) 18. 
23 Duffy (n1) 19. For a chronology of events, different struggles and terrorist acts See Ben Saul and 
Naomi Hart ‘Chronology of Events’ Ben Saul (ed.) Documents in International Law (Hart Publishing 
2012). 
24 Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963; Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1971; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons 1973; International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988; Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 
1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation 1988; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991; 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997; International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999; Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 2005; Protocol to 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005 
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 2010; 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 2010; Protocol 
to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 2014 
25 Saul ‘Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism …’ (n 20) 9. 
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extradite the perpetrator eliminating the political exception, which would prevent extradition if the crime 
was proven to be political.26 Only six include exclusion clauses, which makes the specific acts 
inapplicable during armed conflict, due to the application of IHL.27 Three explicitly mention terrorism,28 
and only the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism is heralded for stipulating 
what it means by terrorism,29 and since it has been widely ratified,30 its definition has become a point of 
reference. Saul goes as far as claiming that its consistent provisions, supported with subsequent 
UNSCR and State practice, could be interpreted as an ‘international anti-terrorism law’ coming from 
different sources but ‘sufficiently universal and rule like so as to establish genuinely new customary 
international law rules.’31 Although it does not exclude itself from application in conflict, some of its 
language blurs the language between peace with conflict when it refers to ‘any other person not taking 
an active part in hostilities.’32 As will be shown later this law has had some, perhaps unintended 
consequences, specifically on humanitarian action.  
 
In contrast, efforts to design a Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism (CCT) that 
started in 2000 have so far been unsuccessful. The intention is not to exhaustively analyse the different 
proposals and the intricacies of the language surrounding the negotiations, as this has been covered 
elsewhere.33 It is, however useful to note that the three ongoing points of contention can be summarised 
                                                 
26 Saul ‘Defining Terrorism’ (n 21) 39. Extradition law traditionally allowed for an exception to be argued 
for a political offence, however, this has been removed in certain treaties. Duffy (n 1) 24.  
27 Van Poecke, T. ‘The IHL Exclusion Clause, and why Belgian Courts Refuse to Convict PKK Members 
for Terrorist Offences’ (EJIL Talk, 20 March 2019) Available from: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ihl-
exclusion-clause-and-why-belgian-courts-refuse-to-convict-pkk-members-for-terrorist-offences/ > 
accessed 28 August 2019. 
28 Namely, the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing; 1999 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 2005 International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  
29 Article 2 first refers to crimes stipulated in the preceding conventions and then expands to the 
following: 
‘2 (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, 
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’ International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999; entered into force 10 April 2002) No. 38349 [From 
herein 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention] 
30 Refer to UN Treaty Collection, available < https://treaties.un.org/ >  
31 Ben Saul ‘The Emerging International Law of Terrorism’ in Ben Saul (ed.) Documents in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2012) Lxxvii.  
32 Daniel O’Donnel ‘International treaties against terrorism and the use of terrorism during armed 
conflict and by armed forces’ (December 2006) 88.864 IRRC 869. 
33 For example, see, Mahmoud Hamoud ‘Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism: Major Bones of Contention’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
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as the fear of political abuse of a definition of terrorism, its scope of application, and relationship to the 
other Conventions. 34 The first two relate to whether struggles of liberation would be excluded from the 
definition of terrorism, and thereby perceived as ‘legitimate’ causes that oppose the State either in 
armed conflict or occupation. For this reason, the NAM/OIC advocated for a definition to include State 
terrorism. 35 And as such the other outstanding question related to excluding the convention from these 
situations and if then it would exclude armed forces and if this interpretation would include non-state 
armed groups.36 One interesting observation likens these debates to the  
historic and seemingly everlasting divide over who has the right to use force without 
being described as a terrorist…The dominant military power approach versus the 
‘patriotic’ power approach appeared once again as it had during the negotiations of the 
1907 Hague Regulations, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 37   
The outstanding questions centre around the legitimacy, or rather the right to use force, with Western 
States arguing that violence could only be used by the State and rendering everything outside of this 
as terrorist. This viewpoint denies that conflict is inevitable, an underlying assumption of IHL which aims 
to apply the rules of war equally without entering into questions of legitimacy. For this reason, 
counterterrorist laws should include specific exclusion clauses to distinguish situations of conflict and/or 
occupation regulated by IHL from counterterrorist laws which aim to outlaw any violence not used by 
the government.38  
 
In the absence of a Comprehensive Convention, there are 25 regional conventions and their protocols.39 
Some have produced ‘generic definitions’, which have not added much to the definition of terrorist, 
while, others, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) referred to existing conventions which 
list specific acts of terrorism.40 It could be argued that together with the sectoral conventions they 
contribute to a normative framework, in which terrorism is criminalised, yet the absence of a 
                                                 
34 Ibid 1031. 
35 UNGA, ‘Letter dated 3 August 2005 from the Chairman of the Sixth Committee addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly’ (12 August 2005) UN Doc A/59/894  
36 Ibid.  
37 Hamoud (n 33) 1033. 
38 Pejic ‘Big Difference’ (n 17) 191. 
39 For reference: UN, International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of 
International Terrorism (UN NY, 2019)  
40 Duffy (n1) 27.  
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comprehensive definition puts into question what is meant by terrorism. In spite of the seriousness that 
the international community ascribes to terrorism, it is worth noting that the Rome Conference leading 
to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was unable to define terrorism and 
therefore could not include it as crime in its statute due to the different positions and subsequent fears 
that any adaptation would politicise the ICC.41  It is interesting to note that even guidance for States, 
such as, the Commonwealth Secretariat Model Law notes the absence of consensus and gives two 
options in how to define terrorist act and advises, but does not instruct, that ‘[c]ountries may also wish 
to include specific exclusion clauses such as those relating self-determination or national liberation 
movements.’42 States were pushed by the UN Security Council to react to the threat of terrorism on 
peace and security by enacting domestic laws, however, the push lacked a consistent and uniform 
approach which may have created a common understanding and approach. Unfortunately, as the 
different mechanisms have shown there are differing approaches, which underlines the difficult of 
speaking of one ‘terrorism.’ 
 
B.  UNSC Resolutions and Proliferation of Domestic Counterterrorist legislation  
Nevertheless, while the debates over terrorism’s definition continued, the international community when 
confronted with sensational transnational bombing by groups such as Al Qaeda,43 through the UN 
Security Council Resolutions took a proactive approach and branded terrorism as ‘threat of peace and 
security’ and under Chapter VII mandate passed resolutions obligating member States to ‘prevent, 
suppress and punish terrorism’.44  
 
As such, two main approaches in countering terrorism ensued; UNSCR 1267 (1999) established the 
sanctions regime against the Taliban for ‘harbouring and training terrorist in the territory of Afghanistan 
as well as their refusal to surrender Osama Bin Laden.’45 Following September 11, 2001 (from herein 
                                                 
41 Ben Saul ‘Defining Terrorism’ (n 21) 38.  
42 Commonwealth Secretariat ‘Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism’ 
(September 2002) available 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/commonwealth_model_english.pdf> accessed 20 August 
2019. 4-5.   
43 First, the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salam, Tanzania, which 
resulted in UNSCR 1267 and then the attack on the US twin towers in September 11, 2001, after which 
UNSCR 1373 was issued. UNSC, Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/Res/1267 
44 The Security council acting under Chapter VII in its functions to restore peace and security can pass 
resolutions that all UN member States are obligated to implement. Bianchi (n 4) 667.  
45 UNSC, Resolution 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/Res/1267 
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9/11), UNSCR 1373, reaffirmed the approach of classifying terrorism as a ‘threat to international peace 
and security,’ and under Chapter VII, instructed States to become party to relevant conventions and 
strengthen their laws to counter terrorism. It had a strong focus on stopping the ‘financing, supporting 
and promoting terrorism.’ The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was to oversee the implementation 
of UNSCR 1373,46  and provide technical support.47 Yet, both resolutions, and subsequent ones, lacked 
a definition of terrorism and referred to the previous sectoral conventions, most of which do not define 
terrorism. After much criticism, UNSCR 1566 (2004), also acting under Chapter VII, provided what could 
be understood as the UNSC political working definition: 
Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state 
of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate 
a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature…48  
However, it does not obligate States to adopt it as such.49 It can be argued that it does not add anything 
beyond what was already existing.50 Normally the aforementioned acts are either punishable by criminal 
law, or even by IHL considering it has identified civilians as a specific category begetting the question, 
from an IHL perspective, as opposed to armed forces. So, aside from proscribing States to enact laws, 
the Security Council has not offered an undisputed meaning of terrorism at an international level.51 
Moreover, UNSC Resolutions emphasised that domestic counterterrorist legislation must be in line with 
international law, yet there is no ‘general rule of international law specifying the relationship’ between 
the two and even lex specialis could not be useful as each norm could be seen as ‘best adapted to the 
overlapping, exceptional violence that they address.’52 The exclusion clause is an instructive tool to 
                                                 
46 UNSC, Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1373  
47 Duffy (n1) 31.  
48 UNSC, Resolution 1566 (08 October 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1566 para 3.  
49 Saul ‘The Emerging International Law of Terrorism’ Lxxiii.  
50 Ibid. Lxxv.   
51 Ibid. Lxxvi.   
52 Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism…’ (n 20) 8 – 9.  
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guide courts to which law is at play at any given time since there is nothing else that stipulates this. In 
its absence transnational terrorist acts could be crimes under both IHL and counterterrorist legislation.53  
Debates about whether or not to include an exclusion clause are more about ‘political struggle over 
labelling and the stigmatisation and delegitimization it brings.’54 For this reason, the exclusion clause is 
imperative to ensure the distinction between the two regimes and encourages compliance and ‘the 
effectiveness of IHL and its humanitarian purpose’55 
 
The listing and sanctions regime started with UNSCR 1267, which ordered travel bans, arms embargo 
and freezing of assets of the Taliban, a NSAG in Afghanistan that was accused of harbouring the 
terrorist Al Qaeda,56 and established a sanctions committee to monitor its implementation by States.57 
Subsequent resolutions would continue in a similar manner and the more recent, UNSCR 2249 (2015), 
expanded the committee’s remit to the oversee the listing and delisting of the ‘ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-
Qaeda Sanctions List.’58 In this resolution States were instructed to take ‘all necessary measures’ [a 
term used for the authorization of the use of force] and to ‘redouble and coordinate their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed by ISIS.’59 The use of such harsh language conflates war 
and terrorism, which is not the purpose of this resolution, and given that States are left to their own 
interpretation is careless. Following the directives of the UNSCR 1373 the sanctions and listing 
mechanism appears in regional mechanisms such as the EU Council Regulation60 and has been 
translated into domestic legislation.  For example, the UK enacted the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 
(2010) and publishes a ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisation’ list, which in addition to 14 previously 
proscribed Northern Irish Organisations enumerates 76 international organisations this includes groups 
                                                 
53 Ibid 10. 
54 Ibid 11. 
55 Ibid 12.  
56 The Taliban was instructed to “cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international 
terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory 
under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps” UNSCR 1267, (n 45) 2.  
57 Ibid. (n 45) 3. 
58 Bianchi (n 4) 668. 
59 Ibid 664. 
60 Council of European Union ‘Factsheet: The EU list of persons, groups and entities subject to 
specific measures to combat terrorism’ (14 January 2015) available at  
<https://www.government.se/4ad8f7/contentassets/29f8d11a200f413c89cb6ef398562cd6/eu-fact-
sheet-on-terrorism.pdf >  accessed 30 August 2019.  
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such as Boko Haram, Al Shabab and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).61 These groups are also 
recognised as parties to a NIAC.62 It is also interesting to note that the UK list is much wider than the 
EU List which only identifies 21 groups which does not include Boko Haram and Al Shabab.63 It is 
instructive to compare also to the ‘UN Consolidated List,’ which includes Al Shabab, but not Boko Haram 
or the PKK.64 Indeed States are complying with the UNSCR, but the discrepancies between the lists 
underlines different interpretations of what constitutes terrorism and/or a terrorist group. Furthermore, 
it can reflect political interpretation, alliances and differing security concerns.65 In general, the listing 
process has been criticised for lack of transparency, due process and questioned for its effectiveness.66  
 
In the absence of an authoritative international definition of terrorism, the 2011 Special Tribunal 
Lebanon (STL) attempted to ascertain whether there is an international crime of terrorism. In order to 
establish its own jurisdiction it based itself on the Arab Convention Against Terrorism, Lebanese 
domestic law and measured these against UNSC and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolutions.67 It interpreted that terrorism as a customary crime ‘exists in peacetime and not in armed 
conflict.’68 Since the aforementioned laws had various interpretations of terrorism, the STL looked for 
common elements that could satisfy a customary rule.69 The STL proceeded to show how this crime 
has been recognized and interpreted by other courts, which base themselves on the Conventions and 
                                                 
61 UK Home Office ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisations’ (12 April 2019) available 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7
95457/Proscription_website.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
62 Anyssa Bellal, The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2018 (Geneva Academy, April 2019) 32. Also, 
can refer to the Uppsala University Classification project, available 
<https://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia> 
63 Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 amending and updating the list of persons, 
groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1084 
[2019] OJ L.6.6 [From herein EU Sanctions List] 
64 UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions list (01 September 2019) available 
<https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resou
rces/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl> accessed 02 September 2019.  
65 In 2010, a more thorough comparison was made, which demonstrated there ‘is less overlap than 
one can expect.’ Benjamin Freedman ‘Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) 
Organizations a Comparison of Lists from six Countries and two International Organisations’ (May 
2010) 4.2 Perspectives on Terrorism 46.  
66 Roach (n 11) 752 
67 STL Interlocutory Decision (n 9) 3.  
68 Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism …’ (n 20)   
69 ‘The perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), 
or threatening such an act; ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally 
entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority 
to take some actions, or to refrain from taking it; iii) when the act involves a transnational element.’ 
STL Interlocutory Decision (n 9) para 85. 
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the UNSC resolutions, and the behaviour in States in prosecuting perpetrators as well as adapting own 
laws.70 Criticism of this conclusion has pointed out that state practice of domestic counterterrorist 
legislation showed differences across 160 countries and identified that some of the laws ‘patently violate 
international human rights law, such as being too vague to satisfy the principle of legality and freedom 
from retroactive criminal punishment under article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.’ 71 As such, the STL contributes to the attempt at criminalising terrorism in international law in 
times of peace, however, the criticism suggests that it is far from being accepted. As will be shown 
below, in times of war, acts of terrorism, or ‘international crime of terrorism in times of armed conflict is 
indeed defined in [IHL].’72 
 
As the above establishes, attempts in defining terrorism have been inconclusive. Sectoral treaties 
outlawing specific transnational terrorist acts are the groundwork of a normative counterterrorist network 
by extending jurisdiction to either prosecute or extradite. The UNSC Resolutions have contributed to 
this, but aside from obligating adoption of domestic counterterrorist legislations, its response has been 
irresponsible, or perhaps just political, in not offering a concrete definition and guidance in how States 
should proceed creating an incoherent approach. In spite of the plethora of legislation at international, 
regional and domestic level, even STL’s attempt to identify a customary norm has due to criticism been 
inconclusive. Yet this has not impeded the use of the term, which undoubtedly gives emphasis to the 
severity of a crime, but for this reason can also be easily manipulated politically.  
 
Post 9/11 and particularly following UNSCR 1373, 155 new laws were adopted by 109 States in 
comparison to 36 laws in 31 States pre-9/11. 73 For those that have not had many prosecutions ‘there 
is a sense that new terrorism laws have been enacted primarily to comply with supra-national 
                                                 
70 STL Interlocutory Decision (n 9) para 86-90. 
71 Saul ‘Emerging International Law of Terrorism’ (n 31) Lxxiv. 
72 Antonio Coco, ‘The Mark of Cain the Crime of Terrorism in Times of Armed Conflict as interpreted 
by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in R v. Mohammed Gul’ (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 428. 
73  Elena Pokalova ‘Legislative Responses to Terrorism: What Drives States to Adopt New 
Counterterrorism Legislation? Terrorism and Political Violence’ (2015) Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 478. 
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demands.’74 For example, in 2002 Nigeria ‘jumped on board and criminalise terrorism and adopted the 
OAU [Organisation of African Union] definition word for word’ without an internal debate.75 
 
On the whole, domestic counterterrorist legislations are meant to facilitate cooperation, prosecution and 
extradition of those responsible for transnational terrorist acts, most prominently the financing, 
supporting and promoting terrorism, and in accordance of international law. 76 The legislation usually 
addresses domestic acts, which in the past would have been ‘prosecuted as ordinary crime or offences 
against public order or state security.’77 Although the international framework to counter terrorism was 
intended to cover the gap of legislation during peace time, what is interesting to note is that these laws 
have been readily used in countries experiencing internal conflict. For example, a study of 35,000 
terrorism related prosecutions found that half of them were in Turkey and China, ‘with Turkey accounting 
for a third of these convictions and Turkey and China accounting for more than half of them.’78 A more 
detailed study would be required to understand specifically the specific crimes and convictions, but both 
countries are not known for their open media and information especially when it comes to security 
matters, however, both have internal resistance movements. Already, the statistics are suggestive. In 
some cases, States have incorporated terrorist offences in their penal code as opposed to having 
separate terrorist laws.79  
 
It is also possible that States ‘diverse historical and political national contexts’80 influence own 
interpretation and in conceptualising what is terrorism or who is a terrorist.81 For example, the ‘UK 
approach can make a terrorist out of nothing.’82 This can be politically convenient, however, the implied 
lack of precision could put in question whether the law satisfies the principle of legality.83 At both an 
international, and domestic levels, laws need to be ‘sufficiently clear and accessible that individuals are 
                                                 
74 Roach (n 11) 686.   
75 Jennifer Giroux and Michael Nwankpa ‘A vicious cycle: The growth of terrorism and 
counterterrorism in Nigeria, 1999-2016) in Michael J. Boyle (ed) Non-Western Responses to terrorism 
(Manchester University Press 2019) 418.  
76 Duffy (n1) 43. 
77 Saul ‘Defining Terrorism’ (n 21) 35. 
78 Roach (n 11) 685.  
79 Pokalova (n 73) 477. 
80 Duffy (n1) 30. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Roach (n 11) 679. 
83 Duffy (n1) 30. 
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able to conform their behaviour to the limits of the law.’84 For this reason, the sectoral conventions with 
clear prohibitions of acts were more readily agreed than a vague, yet disputed, and political concept of 
terrorism. It is also worth interrogating whether these different broad laws would ‘satisfy the requirement 
of ‘double criminality,’ which often represents a hurdle in terrorism-related extradition case.’85 Again, 
this raises questions whether the proliferation of domestic counterterrorist laws have added anything 
new or have been effective.86 The international push for domestic legislation was to facilitate interstate 
cooperation, and yet in reality the focus on legislating without a unified understanding of what is to be 
criminalised may have a counterproductive effect.  
 
Whilst during times of peace, in a functioning democracy, this may not seem as an immediate concern 
due to presumed checks and balances.87 In other political systems and during times of war these 
approaches can have adverse effects. Especially if there is already internal opposition and the 
counterterrorist laws take form as administrative or military legislation. For example, Russia since the 
early 1990s faced an internal opposition from Chechnyan separatist movement. It first confronted this 
opposition with legislation entitled ‘Suppression of Terrorism’ (1998), which ‘in a way Russia bombed 
Chechnya into Radica Islam.’88 When the resurgence of radical Islam came in early 2000, in response 
Russia changed its approach and made concessions with a ‘Chechenization’ geared towards the re-
integration of fighters, accompanied by formal amnesties, and massive reconstruction programmes, 
which answered some of the underlying grievances of the population.89 This also demonstrates an 
approach to contain the violence, rather a policy of ‘wiping out,’90 which is often implied in 
counterterrorist rhetoric.  
                                                 
84 Duffy (n 1) 40.  
85 Bianchi (n 4) 662. 
86 Bianchi (n 4) 660. 
87 Roach (n 11) 672; Perhaps one of the reasons for the division between the democratic states 
adherence to the use of terrorism is due to the insistence that any challenge to the government has to 
be done through the democratic process, which may not be available in other political systems and 
the use of force against the government may seem more legitimate. Mariona Llobet Anglí ‘What does 
terrorism mean?’ in Aniceto Masferrer and Clive Walker (eds) Counter-terrorism, Human Rights and 
the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, 2013) 34. This also relates to the concept of legitimacy, and as far 
back as the 17C, it was accepted that if the sovereign was not protecting the people then it would be 
legitimate to stand up against him. Noam Zamir Classification of Conflicts in International 
Humanitarian Law: The Legal Impact of Foreign (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 15. 
88 Ekaterina Stepanova ‘Russia’s Response to terrorism in the twenty-first century’ in Michael J. Boyle 
Non-Western Responses to terrorism Manchester (Manchester University Press 2019) 34. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 
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Often these military legislations allow special powers or exceptional regimes, which have been criticised 
for being secretive and not follow due process, and thus prone to abuse.91 If in fact the situation is one 
of NIAC, then IHL should apply, however not all countries have enacted exclusion clauses. Some, like 
Canada clearly excludes both international and non-international armed conflict from the terrorism 
related offences clearly giving way to IHL application.  In contrast, neither Australia or the United 
Kingdom share this view.92 This may indicate that if outside of scope IHL, then any other situation should 
be compliant with International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and actions should be conducted through 
police and law enforcement.93  
 
It is interesting to note that in Russia one of its counterterrorist operations was deemed to contravene 
the right to life because of disproportionate use of force. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
did held that Russia did not derogate its obligations during the operations: ‘[n]o state of emergency or 
martial law has been declared in Chechnya. No federal law has been enacted to restrict the rights of 
the population of the area. No derogation under Article 15 of the Convention has been made.94 The 
government referred to its legislation on the Suppression of Terrorism, which was upheld at the highest 
level and cited praise from the President for the said operation, one of the reasons why he did not allow 
for proper investigation and prosecution of those involved.95 This illustrates the use of domestic 
legislation in lieu of derogations, or application of IHL, possibly due to the fact that the State was 
confronted with what it called a terrorist group and for this reason was more easily able to invoke internal 
powers. Also, it highlights the role of an outside mechanism, in this case, regional able to make a 
judgement on the application of domestic laws in pursuing terrorism, and it would be interesting to make 
a survey of all counterterrorist laws to see if they are compatible with international law, or if in the 
urgency of responding to the terrorist threat they would have similar gaps. Such jurisprudence is 
necessary to hold State’s accountable for their actions, however, it seems to be the exception rather 
than the rule.   
 
                                                 
91 Pokalova (n 73) 492.  
92 Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism …’ (n 20) 13.  
93 Hampson (n 15) 85. This has a more protective framework than IHL because use of force is 
regulated by the proportionality of the threat posed and not in relation to the military objective. 
94 Isayeva v. Russia App no. 57950/00 (ECHR, 24 February 2005) para 133.  
95 Ibid para 143.  
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III. Current Counterterrorist Framework in NIAC 
The previous section established the international community’s challenge in coming to an agreed 
definition of terrorism and the surrounding debate of whether, or not, it should apply in conflict. These 
issues have been transposed onto States after the progressive push, through UNSC Resolutions, to 
criminalise terrorism in domestic legislations. This section will explore first the interplay between IHL 
and terrorism, and then see how they interact in NIAC.  
 
A. IHL and Terrorism  
Since 9/11 and the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), a widely disputed and legally incorrect term, 
there is a tendency to conflate terrorism and armed conflict.96 This as well perpetuates the rendering of 
the terrorist as the ‘other’ and ‘non-citizen,’ and facilitating harsh policies in response to terrorist acts. 
Although both terrorism and conflict imply the use of violence, there are important differences between 
the two. Acts of terrorism do not automatically trigger an armed conflict.97 If a conflict is determined, 
even if one of the parties are so called terrorist groups, then it could trigger the application of IHL (the 
Four Geneva Conventions (GCI-IV) and the two Additional Protocols (API/APII)), which recognises that 
there may be lawful attacks on appropriate targets so long as there is a military objective and it follows 
the rules of distinction and proportionality. Furthermore, IHL in its essence recognises the equality of 
belligerents and advocates for the protection of prisoners, sick and wounded and civilians and ensures 
provision of humanitarian aid.  In contrast, counterterrorism aims to criminalise all violence by non-state 
actors.  As such, if not separated then domestic counterterrorism laws challenge the logic of IHL and 
can impede its application leading to adverse effects for the victims of conflict.  
 
                                                 
96 Identified as one of the main challenges in 2011. ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the 
challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’ 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (October 2011) Geneva 31IC/11/5.1.2 page 48.   
97 It is a factual consideration when an armed conflict is triggered. IAC are wars between States and 
an armed attack can trigger the application of IHL. NIAC are essentially civil wars, although a much 
more complicated classification can be determined, and are between a State and a non-state armed 
group, or can be between two non-state armed groups. They can be internationalised (i.e. outside of 
the borders of one state) It can be determined based on the level of violence reaching a certain 
threshold, which has to be beyond an internal disturbance or riot, and a minimum organisation of the 
armed group usually said that need to follow orders. Noam Zamir Classification of Conflicts in 
International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Impact of Foreign Intervention (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2017) 57, 61. 
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Distinction between the two regimes does not mean that there would be impunity for terrorist acts during 
war. IHL adequately covers the prohibition of acts that cause terror, even during war. First of all, through 
the basic rules of distinction and proportionality.98 Moreover, explicitly Article 33 of GCIV, States that 
‘all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.’99 Similarly, API Article 51.2 calls for the 
distinction of civilians and prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror.’100 The same is found in APII under Article 13.2, additionally APII Article 4.2 lists acts, such as 
taking of hostages, degrading treatment, rape and acts of terrorism which are at all times prohibited. 101  
These interpretations have been confirmed in International Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with 
the prosecution of Galić, the Commander responsible for the bombing of Sarajevo.102 The court 
examined the ‘nature, manner, timing and duration of the [bombing] campaign’103 in order to establish 
intent to cause terror and deduced that from the acts no civilian was made to feel safe and so its purpose 
could be no other than to ‘instil in the civilian population a state of extreme fear.’104 The court confirmed 
that this crime incurred individual criminal responsibility customarily applied also in NIAC. In a similar 
manner, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) established in a number of cases (Brima et al. 
(2008), Sesay et al (2009), and Taylor (2012)) that acts such as burning of property, sexual violence 
and violence, such as amputations and mutilations, were found to have had the intent to spread terror 
and were successful in their prosecution on this basis.105 Although, IHL does not define terrorism as 
such, it does ensure that any terrorist acts are prohibited. In fact, its focus on acts and behaviour can 
be easier to discern and punish than an intent to cause terror, which presumably would need to form 
part of a pure crime of terrorism.  
 
                                                 
98 O’Donnel (n 31) 863.  
The relevant articles for distinction and proportionality: Article 48 (distinction), Article 51 (protection of 
civilians from, for example, indiscriminate attacks) and Article 57 (to take all feasible precautions) in 
the Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2 (adopted 12 
Aug. 1949, entered into force Entry into force: 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter GC IV] 
99 GC IV (ibid) Article 33. 
100 Other relevant articles are Art 37.1 which prohibits perfidy and Art 75.2 which prohibits the taking 
of hostages. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into 
force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter API] 
101 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force on 
7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 [hereinafter APII] 
102 Bianchi (n 4) 666. 
103 Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism …’ (n 20) 4. 
104 Ibid 5.  
105 Ibid 5. 
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B. NIAC, IHL and Counterterrorism  
IHL was codified after decades of international armed conflict, and so its provision in this context is 
extensive and clear. Since, then the majority of conflicts are NIAC and it is important to note that it is 
increasingly internationalised. Since, it is technically an internal conflict, States generally may not wish 
involvement from the international community and there is no international body that can authoritatively 
classify it as such and apply IHL.106 Yet, given the internationalisation of NIAC this should be considered 
along with a reinforcement of IHL, which in NIAC is less protective ‘its rules accord much consideration 
for the concerned State’s sovereignty.’107 This becomes more important with the proliferation of 
domestic counterterrorist legislation, especially if they do not exclude themselves from situations 
governed by IHL .  
 
IHL in NIAC is governed by either Common Article 3 (CA3) to all Four Geneva Conventions or Additional 
Protocol II, both proclaim only the most basic rules as compared to IAC. However, CA3 has increasingly 
become known as a mini convention and its application covers a lot of the same rules, and although 
technically there can be a difference of application between CA3 and APII, the ICRC Customary Study 
does not distinguish because in practice States do not make the distinction.108 Moreover, has shown 
that through State practice many of the rules of IAC are also applicable in NIAC.109 In fact, the ICRC 
Customary Study found that ‘148 out of a total of 161 rules formulated are applicable regardless of 
whether international or non-international conflict is involved.’110 However, important differences 
remain. The most significant is that, unlike in IAC, in NIAC, there is no combatant status and therefore 
no equality of belligerency between States and non-state armed groups (NSAG). States can and do 
                                                 
106 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (Cambridge University Press, 2016) para 
865. ‘Furthermore, it serves to underline that, as international humanitarian law applies based on the 
facts, regardless of whether a State qualifies the members of a non-State armed group as ‘terrorists’ 
or its actions as ‘terrorism’, humanitarian law applies if and when the conditions for its applicability are 
met.’ Ibid para 867. ICRC classifies conflicts for their perusal and discussions with States, this, 
however is rarely shared with the public.  
107 Sassòli ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (n 19) Sassòli suggest that it would make sense for 
development of a ‘law specific to such transnational armed conflicts,’ however it is doubtful that this 
would result in a protective framework as States are still reluctant to give any recognition to non-state 
armed groups, and ultimately any such law would need to determine whether it would reinforce the 
equality of belligerent. (para 10.30)  
108 Jelena Pejic ‘The protective scope of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye’ (March 2011) 
93.811 IRRC 2. 
109 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Volume I: Rules (Cambridge 2005) [From herein ICRC Customary Study] xxxv 
110 Pejic ‘Protective scope…’ (n 108) 17. 
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criminalise the participation in NSAG. Arguably this has been made worse with NSAG being labelled 
as terrorist, although this label does not ‘preclude that they are also armed groups for the purpose of 
IHL. While terrorist acts may be committed in a NIAC and may even trigger a NIAC, they neither 
necessarily trigger a NIAC or preclude the applicability of IHL of NIACs.’111 However, it does mean that 
with the domestic counterterrorist laws the terrorist labelled NSAG can, and do fall, under their 
provisions. 
 
It is interesting to note that the State’s ability to criminalise opposition under domestic law in NIAC 
mirrors the questions of legitimacy and right to use violence, which were brought out during the 
discussions to define terrorism during the Drafting of the CCT. As previously mentioned, the NAM/OIC 
position insisted that any definition of terrorism should not criminalise national liberation struggles, and 
there should be no difference in application between State and non-state armed forces underlining the 
importance of the exclusion clause. These arguments were put forward for the legitimate struggles post 
colonialism. In that same vein, IHL in IAC recognises that a national liberation movement (NIAC) can 
fall under its provision, Article 1.4 extends to ‘include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
of self-determination.’112 This extension is accompanied with combatant privileges which does not 
criminalise participation, and affords prisoner of war (POW) status if captured, in order to ensure 
humane treatment and enable exchanges to facilitate peace negotiations. And, prosecutions would be 
reserved for those who had violated IHL. This allowance under API, for some, was seen as legitimising 
terrorism.113 It seems that the modern State is sensitive to any opposition to its power, even though 
history shows that conflict is inevitable and one of the reasons for developing rules that need to be 
applied during the war.   
 
Equality of belligerency is one of IHL’s main principles and there are interesting historical examples that 
show that in internal conflicts States would make ad hoc agreements to abide by laws during conflict, 
or for the duration of the conflict States would recognise the insurgent as belligerent and later prosecute 
                                                 
111 Sassòli (n 19) para 10.28.  
112 Article 1.4 API (n 100)  
113 Sassòli (n 19) para 10.25.  
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them as traitors.114 Unfortunately, States fear that extending equality would award legitimacy, although 
IHL is clear that its application ‘has no bearing on the legitimacy in the law.’115 In APII, once it was 
decided that States could criminalise participation, and the implication on equality, as a recourse APII 
Art 6.5 advocated for States to afford ‘the broadest possible amnesties.’116 Amnesties could be 
interpreted as an exemption from prosecution, but they were considered in order to ‘encourage gestures 
of reconciliation which can contribute to re-establishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has 
been divided.’117 This demonstrates IHL’s long term intention is preserving a sense of humanity in war 
to allow for reconciliation, which is more difficult the more a conflict is polarised, something that the 
terrorism term successfully feeds.  
 
Yet ,considering that terrorism and armed conflict are often conflated and the international law is not 
sufficiently authoritative much is still left to State interpretation. For instance, the UK in R v Gul (2012) 
prosecuted a law student for  disseminating videos that ‘showed attacks by Al Qaeda, the Taliban and 
other proscribed groups on military targets, including those in Chechnya and Coalition forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, [and] the use of IEDs against Coalition forces […].’118 The jury then sought clarification 
if these attacks would be considered terrorist if they in fact they hit a legitimate target, such as the 
armed forces, in a NIAC. The judge accepted that in an international armed conflict they would not, but 
claimed the UK’s right to criminalise such acts under its domestic laws, which would render any attack 
by a so-called terrorist group to constitute an act of terrorism.119 This decision has been criticised for 
failing to recognise the exclusion clause and wrongly claiming that “there is nothing in international law 
which would exempt those engaged in attacks on the military during the course of an insurgency from 
the definition of terrorism.”120 This completely ignores the exclusion clause of certain conventions, 
including the Terrorist Bombing Convention, which does not cover acts perpetuated in times conflict 
                                                 
114 ICRC Commentary 2016 (n 106) para 359. 
115 Article 3 GCIV (n 98)  
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117 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 (Nijhoff Publishers 1987) para 4618  
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from its application.121 Although, it should be noted as well that the different conventions have different 
scope of application for the exclusion.122 Moreover, as was seen, IHL sufficiently addresses acts of 
terrorism in conflict and can be relied upon to make appropriate interpretations as has been done by 
various courts; for instance, the Italian Court deferred to it in the Bouyahia Maher Ben Abdelaziz (2007) 
case, and the US Courts referred to IHL to interpret domestic legislation in the Yunis (1999) case.123  
 
More recently, based on its exclusion clause the Belgian court dropped prosecution of the PKK with a 
complex yet detailed consideration of the different laws and jurisdictions at play. Although it accepted 
that the PKK ‘could fit the Belgian Criminal Code’s definition of a terrorist group’ it opted to accept their 
actions in Turkey and ‘their nexus to the conflict and benefit from the application of the exclusion clause, 
[concluding that] the PKK is not a terrorist group […] and participating in its activities is not a terrorist 
offence.’124 The Belgian decision looked beyond the ‘terrorist’ label awarded to the PKK by Turkey, the 
US and the European Union and instead judged it based on the context and relevant considerations of 
the laws at play facilitated by the exclusion clause.  
 
The debates, for example for the discussions on the draft CCT regarding the exclusion clause included 
questions of what constituted armed forces. The Western position advocate that only State armed 
forces can be excluded from any counterterrorist legislation.125 Such a conclusion would disregard the 
notion that States can also be held responsible for terrorism and result in an unequal application of the 
law. When it concerns NIAC, the readings of CA3 have interpreted armed forces to include NSAG so 
long as they are sufficiently organised to follow orders.126 This can be easily disputed as domestic 
legislation allows for the criminalisation of armed groups, however, it is also true that that ‘States have 
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signatory  
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accepted that killing persons taking part in hostilities of non-international character should not 
necessarily be criminalised and punished.’ 127 If this is the case, then this recognition suggests that 
States still wish to make a distinction which requires identifying the armed group as such, whether as 
an identifiable organised group or as directly participating in hostilities. Inadvertently, this recognises 
the principle of distinction, suggesting that States recognise that there are lawful targets, even in NIAC, 
even if attacked by NSAG. This is important because one of the major concerns with the inequality of 
NSAG, and the criminalisation of acts that could be considered lawful under IHL, is that it de-incentivises 
them from respecting the rules of war since they will be punished regardless if they abide by them or 
not.128 This is already a challenge in NIAC and is exacerbated by counterterrorist legislations that do 
not exclude themselves from contexts, such as conflict and occupation that should be governed by IHL, 
and even criminalise beyond participation and look at association, material support, financing, etc..  
 
The preceding section showed that IHL sufficiently prohibits and criminalises terrorist acts committed 
in conflict. It also explained the constraints of IHL application in NIAC, namely the criminalisation of 
NSAG, which already challenges IHL application. At the same time, customary and State practice when 
it concerns distinction, for example, show that even in NIAC the core IHL principles apply. However, 
these are challenged by counterterrorist legislation.  
 
IV. Counterterrorism and IHL in NIAC 
In view of the aforementioned challenges, this section will highlight what happens when the 
counterterrorism framework and IHL intersect in non-international armed conflict. The aim is to 
demonstrate how domestic counterterrorist legislations, inspired by international framework, impede 
IHL application. For this reason, the following will assume that IHL is the normative framework applied 
in times of conflict, including NIAC, with the focus on three core principles; equality of the parties, 
distinction between civilian and fighter and provision of medical and humanitarian aid. Indeed, as was 
described in the previous section equality of the parties is not accepted in NIAC, however, the below 
examples aim to put into question the concerns of States in legitimising the opposition by recognising 
them as equal from the start. In practice, States end up negotiating and even award amnesties to the 
                                                 
127  Coco (n 72) 153.  
128 Olivier Bangerter ‘Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or 
not’ (June 2011) 93.882 IRRC 377. 
Counterterrorism, IHL and NIAC 26 
designated terrorist groups. By not extending this equality, and by criminalising beyond participation to 
those who ‘support, associate and finance,’ the distinction between who is a fighter and who is a civilian 
are blurred. This has many adverse effects and challenges the application of IHL including the provision 
of medical and humanitarian aid. A comprehensive survey of all NIAC affected countries and practices 
is outside the scope of this study, however, the examples below bring to light some of these effects and 
challenges.  
 
A. Equality and Distinction  
As has been shown, whether through rhetoric, policy or laws the ill-defined, yet highly emotive terrorist 
label, is politically convenient, as it ‘…publicly defines them as immoral and evokes fear and moral 
disgust against them…denies that they have any serious political context or legitimacy … dehumanizes 
and demonises them, and is used to morally legitimise state violence against them…’ ⁠129 This, in the 
short term allows the State to take hard line approaches with the publics support and conflicts can end 
in capitulation of the opposition, and often through peace negotiations. Although, States are reluctant 
to award legitimacy at the start of the conflict, negotiating with the so-called terrorists at the end 
undoubtedly has an important legitimizing effect.  It is noteworthy to underline that the US is in continued 
peace negotiations with, the UNSCR 1267 blacklisted, Taliban, and in spite of its continued use terrorist 
tactics. In order to enter in negotiations, the UN had to adjust the Sanctions regime and lift travel bans 
so that the parties could meet.130 Years of delegitimizing the group have not stopped the natural 
outcome of the conflict, which would be either through military defeat or peace negotiation. For this 
reason, it could be seen as a missed opportunity to not recognize them as equal parties to the conflict 
and thereby expect compliance with IHL and foresee the prosecution of war crimes. Instead, in practice 
there is greater emphasis on prosecuting membership, association, material support and limited 
prosecutions of war crimes.  
 
It is also instructive to look at Colombia where the forty-year internal conflict between the FARC and 
the government was increasingly framed within the GWOT as a fight against terrorism; this conveniently 
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facilitated US military support, and enabled strong military response.131 However, when it came to 
negotiate a peace deal there was a sizeable public campaign opposing any negotiation ‘[g]iven their 
perspective of FARC as a terrorist organization, they [did] not conceive a negotiated solution as a proper 
way out of the conflict.’132 This illustrates how a political delegitimization of the opposition with the 
terrorist label is not useful in long run to facilitate ‘peace and security.’  
 
In contrast, IHL does not concern itself with why a conflict started and it focuses on trying to minimize 
the effects of the conflict on those not and/or no longer participating, which is in the long run in the 
interest of peace. For this, it requires that both parties abide by the rules. In NIAC, NSAG have little 
incentive to abide by the rules because their participation in criminalized. And by ‘[t]aking a solely 
repressive approach to armed groups amounts to encouraging them to violate the law.’133 The terrorist 
label, now accompanied with counterterrorist laws, which exacerbate this repressive approach.  
 
For instance, it is interesting to note how the US Courts responded to an NGO who sought clarification 
of the terrorist material support laws, which included criminalising the ‘training, expert advice, or 
assistance’ to a terrorist designated group. The Humanitarian Law Project intended to give, amongst 
other activities, legal training in IHL to political supporters of the Tamil independent movement (since 
the armed wing, the LTTE had been militarily defeated) and the PKK (whose aim is to establish an 
independent Kurdish state in Southern Turkey).134  However, the court upheld the constitutionality of 
the material support provision saying that training the ‘PKK on how to use international law to resolve 
disputes would provide that group with information and techniques that it could use as part of a broader 
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strategy to promote terrorism, and to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.’ 135 Given the labelling of the 
organization as terrorist the court could not conceive it in any other light than having a destructive impact 
on the system, while it could provide an alternative to the use of violence. The Court went on to say 
that,  
[t]he majority justifies the criminalization of this activity in significant part on the ground 
that “peaceful negotiation[s]” might just “bu[y] time…, lulling opponents into 
complacency.” Ante, at 32. And the PKK might use its new information about “the 
structures of the international legal system . . . to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.136 
This reading suggests that the Court is concerned more that the material support would somehow serve 
to legitimise the NSAG, as opposed to being concerned that the material support would facilitate acts 
of terrorism, since the teaching of IHL would presumably decrease such acts. Its reading is contrary to 
the principle of IHL as it ostensibly does not take into consideration, for example the effect of violence 
on civilians during conflict. Second of all, it makes a presumption that NSAG cannot change, perhaps 
politically prefers to keep them criminal in order to facilitate their repression; however, there are many 
examples of NSAG restraining behaviour once the rules are made clear.137 This is an example of how 
counterterrorist laws usurp humanitarian space that IHL has, through the years, attempted to safeguard 
in a conflict with the pure intention of minimising the adverse effects on those who are not or no longer 
participating in hostilities.  
 
In contrast, on the local level it is almost surprising to learn that States consider, and allow for, amnesties 
for members of some of the most notorious terrorist NSAG, such as Boko Haram, al Shabaab and to 
lesser extent ISIS in Iraq. The following examples will be drawn from these three NSAG that continually 
steal headlines for their terrorist tactics and therefore have been sanctioned by the international 
community. It is also important to at least consider that these groups have evolved or are rooted in 
complicated local contexts that cannot be adequately explained in this paper. 138 Acknowledging these 
realities does not justify their tactics, however, reducing them to terrorists may in the short term facilitate 
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a heavy-handed approach, but in the long run will not address the underlying issues driving the 
continued use of violence. Regardless, of the reasons for the conflict, inevitably States will need to 
consider how to end it in a way that can facilitate a longer peace, and this may be particularly difficult if 
a lot of violations have happened and if it is difficult to distinguish between the NSAG and the 
community. 
 
It should not be surprising that amnesties would be considered as they are normal mechanism in 
transitional justice processes. The surprise comes because of the sustained polarising rhetoric against 
terrorists, which through ‘othering’ and ‘dehumanising’ detracts from a vision on if ever they may be re-
integrated. Less surprising are stories that insinuate the only way to eradicate the terrorist threat is to 
‘kill them all’ as one Iraqi security officer suggested as the way to quell the re-emergence of ISIS.139  Or 
stories about ISIS commanders being unable to negotiate withdrawal or surrender with the opposing 
Iraqi forces, and therefore would prefer to turn themselves in to Kurdish forces ‘who had a reputation 
for taking prisoners rather than executing them.’140 Such behaviour suggests serious violations of IHL. 
Undeniably, ISIS has committed a multitude of IHRL and IHL violations,141 however, the respect of IHL 
is not incumbent on reciprocity.142 There is a fine balance and the more a conflict is polarised the more 
difficult it is to achieve respect for any rules by anyone. This polarisation will also hinder peace and 
security.  
 
Unfortunately, on an international level, the UNSC resolutions play into this rhetoric by perpetuating an 
inadequately defined term. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the UNSC approach may differ based 
on groups, for example the UNSCR 2349 (2017) advocates for comprehensive approaches for Boko 
Haram, which includes human rights compliant de-radicalisation. In contrast the UNSCR 2379 (2017) 
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on ISIS is less comprehensive and focuses on prosecutions of war crimes committed by ISIS,143 and 
without addressing the prosecution of war crimes committed by forces fighting ISIS.144 It is not clear, if 
this suggests that on the list of terrorists there are better or worse terrorist, and how this would be 
determined, or this further demonstrates the different terrorisms at play. Different approaches would be 
more comprehensible, if for example, one NSAG would be complying more with IHL, than the other, 
and therefore able to receive different treatment. For this, the State would need to acknowledge the 
NSAG as such and be open to more equal treatment in conflict, for example allow IHL training, or enter 
into an agreement to respect the rules, rather than focusing on mere delegitimization. On this point, it 
is also interesting to note that the Nigerian government intervened with UN against listing Boko Haram 
as a terrorist organisation as it would make it more complicated to negotiate with them,145 showing the 
potential effect of the international counterterrorist framework and its effects on local context that need 
a pragmatic engagement with NSAG.  
 
On the question of amnesties, IHL foresees this even in NIAC, especially for those who participated in 
the conflict, but did not commit crimes.146 Admittedly, one of the challenges of present-day conflicts is 
the NSAG groups rejection of governments or international institutions. For instance, Boko Haram 
outright rejects negotiation and prospect of amnesty from the Nigerian government demonstrating the 
highly polarised nature of the conflict.147 Nevertheless, as a measure to counter recruitment and 
encourage defection the government adopted ‘Operation Safe Corridor,’ which is a policy not enshrined 
into law, but one which includes a de-radicalisation and amnesty programme because the military 
campaign ‘frequently conflated perpetrators with victims.’148 Likewise in Somalia, since it is becoming 
increasingly likely that a military solution may not be possible, the government has started to explore 
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programmes to weaken al Shabaab through low- and high-level defections through a de-radicalization 
and reintegration programme for low level members of the group. Higher ranking commanders are able 
to benefit from ‘ad hoc political deals …, who, in exchange for defecting along with their followers, 
receive protection and red-carpet treatment from the Somali government and face no accountability or 
scrutiny for their past behaviour.’149 This, in spite of, the UN and other countries that have a formal 
policy to not negotiate with al Shabaab.150 The practicalities of war need pragmatism, however, this 
should not also be accompanied by impunity and should be held responsible for their actions, which 
does not appear to be the current case.  
 
In Iraq, the initial General Amnesty Law (No. 27/2016) allowed the use of pardons for those who joined 
IS ‘against their will and did not commit any serious crimes’, however, due to reports of corruption and 
abuse the law was amended and now ‘preclude[s] pardons for anyone convicted of terrorism, 
regardless of mitigating circumstances.’151 And, in practice, reportedly the judges are reluctant to offer 
pardons.152 First, it is interesting to note the use of amnesties even against those sanctioned to be 
international terrorists. This shows that in spite of the counterterrorist rhetoric, eventually the State will 
need to engage in looking for peaceful solutions to the conflict. Second, the fact that amnesties are 
used, even if through defection programmes, puts into question States’ initial reluctance to reinforce 
IHL in NIAC for fears of legitimising the group. By criminalising the membership, as will be seen below, 
misses the point of holding NSAG accountable for war crimes and other violations of IHL. The 
aforementioned amnesty processes have been criticised for allowing impunity. In addition to this, they 
can be seen as a missed opportunity in using amnesties influence the NSAG behaviour during the 
conduct of hostilities. If there is a real interest, in peace and security then IHL should be reinforced in a 
way that NSAG can be incentivised to follow If there is a real interest, in cooperating and punishing 
those responsible for terrorist acts then there should be more focus on the crimes committed not 
membership, or, the wider interpretation of association, material support, financing, etc.    
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Admittedly, in conflict it may be hard to collect evidence to properly prosecute, nevertheless it is 
important to underline that providing justice through criminal prosecutions serves to  
address legacies of mass abuse and conflict by removing particularly violent  
 individuals from society (specific deterrence); signalling that such activity has 
 consequences (general deterrence); reinforcing the moral repudiation of such activity 
 (expressive function); and fulfilling retributive expectations, particularly of persons and 
 communities most affected.’ 153  
Already the aforementioned practices suggested a culture of impunity in allowing for defections and 
even high-level amnesties without prosecutions of war crimes. For example, in the absence of justice 
in Nigeria, the ICC has opened a preliminary investigation against the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity perpetuated by Boko Haram and Nigerian military under its complementary jurisdiction when 
a country is unwilling or unable to proceed with its own prosecution.154  
 
Nigerian counterterrorism laws criminalises ‘any person who commits, attempts to, threatens to, or 
assists an act of terrorism,’ which has been criticised for the ‘expansive definition and of material and 
non-violent support’155 The prosecution for these crimes saturates the system and criminalises large 
sections of the population who may have been associated, without delivering justice.156 Some statistics 
show the gravity of the problem, ‘[i]n October, 2017, the Nigerian government announced mass trials of 
some 2,540 Boko Haram suspects[…] a further 5,000 would be prosecuted in the coming years.’157 The 
trials are held in secret and the offences are not disclosed only convictions.158 Despite many allegations 
against the military, not one has been tried publicly, the government maintains that hundreds of soldier 
have been court marshalled after violations during the campaigns against Boko Haram.159 As such the 
prosecutions are for simple association charges and do not serious violations such as war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.160 
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Iraq’s 2005 counterterrorist legislation only has six articles and two penalties, either death or life 
imprisonment, which can ‘be applied to a wide range of actions, from simple affiliation and causing 
damage to property to using explosives and seeking to overthrow the government’161 It is currently 
being used to prosecute over ’19,000 people on terrorism-related charges since 2013 and convicted at 
lease 8,861, with at least 3,130 sentenced to death.’162 Most are being prosecuted for association, for 
example the recommendation for someone who cooked for ISIS was a death penalty, similar sever 
penalties for those who worked in administrative functions. Moreover, there is no prioritisation of serious 
crimes, and it is interesting to note that Iraq has not criminalised war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide.163  
 
Unlike Nigeria and Iraq, Somalia has not enacted recent counterterrorist legislation, and its criminal 
code dates back to the 1962 Penal Code, so it is unclear under which laws that suspects are 
sentenced.164 Of note is the approaches in neighbouring Kenya that became involved in the fight against 
al Shabaab in 2011 and in retaliation ‘al Shabaab and its affiliates launched a retaliatory campaign that 
included over ninety attacks […] to target security installations, particularly military garrisons and police 
posts in proximity to the border with Somalia. They also carried out attack on bars, transportation 
hubs…,’165 In the period after, Kenya took a concerted counterterrorist campaign which in certain 
instances could be likened to collective punishment of ethnic Somali communities. For example, after 
one terrorist attack the Police launched ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ in which they ‘rounded up more 
than a thousand ethnic Somalis in Nairobi and held them at Kasarani Stations.’166 Moreover, apparently 
the county commissioner of Mombassa was quoted as saying ‘if we find any of them, we will finish them 
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on the spot. They are not people to take to court.’167 It is an interesting example of a transnationalised 
NIAC which clearly the security forces were not acting within the IHRL framework on their home territory 
with such heavy-handed responses that have been on the one hand facilitated by external pressures 
and even funding. And on the other hand, criticised for not being effective, since their lack of distinction 
of who is the perpetrator from the wider community contributes to the isolation of Kenyan Muslims, who 
are caught up in the massive campaigns, and have little success in delivering justice for the victims.  
 
There are a number of issues that emerge from the above examples. One, is an observation that despite 
the reluctance of States to recognize NSAG as equal parties to an armed conflict, the practice is to 
consider amnesties and re-integration programmes. This however, is rendered difficult if there is very 
stark polarization and if the community has experienced grave violations. On the one hand, the 
proliferation of prosecution can be seen as a means to deliver justice, but given that the focus is on 
membership or association it misses the gravity of the crimes and does not respond to the populations 
need for justice. As such, the terrorist label and the criminalization of the membership of the group does 
not facilitate justice for terrorist acts in any meaningful or signal that the crimes committed are wrong. 
Instead, there are fears that the overboard prosecutions will actually mean a resurgence of groups, 
such as ISIS 2.0.168 In addition to the above, it should be mentioned that communities affiliated with 
these terrorist NSAG that have committed very serious crimes are often unable to easily integrate back 
into communities. In the case of Iraq, for example, women prefer to stay in camps with their children 
because they fear retaliation and revenge if they go back to their home towns. There is a distinction 
between those who stayed in the ISIS administered territory and those who fled, the former seen as 
complicit in the crimes, even if they had no other choice.169 This is very similar in Nigeria where the 
wider population ‘make little distinction between populations who had to endure Boko Haram rule and 
actual Boko Haram members.’170 More research would be needed to understand what is eroding this 
distinction, an initial suggestion would be counterterrorist laws that focus on membership, participation, 
financing, etc. and the assumption that anyone who associates is then deemed a terrorist. It would be 
interesting to test this if this and see if it has an impact on the security forces perception. Although 
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stigmatization and polarisation are often a by-product of war, the fact that the justice system enforces 
such broad interpretations challenges the IHL principle of distinction and lack of proper prosecutions 
for war crimes undermines the rules of war.  
 
B. Access to Medical and Humanitarian Aid  
Building on these examples, it is imperative to see how the broad interpretations and criminalisation of 
material support, association, financing, etc. affect the IHL principles of providing medical and 
humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict. These principles are firmly embedded in IHL in both 
treaty and customary law in both IAC and NIAC with the protection of the wounded, medical personnel 
and medical establishments.171 Similarly, IHL upholds that civilians should have access to humanitarian 
aid.172 These principles date as far back as 1648 have continued to be applied.173 Contemporary broad 
counterterrorist laws are challenging this humanitarian space. If they have not been directly challenged, 
they may suffer a ‘chilling effect,’ which means that those who would have previously been providing 
either medical care or humanitarian aid may now refrain in doing so for fear of prosecution.  
 
Most recently, the Security Council through UNSCR 2462, under Chapter VII, obligated States ‘to 
criminalise financial transactions carried out with the intention that they are to be used for the benefit of 
terrorist organisations or individuals.’174 Although the resolution underlines that this has to be done in 
compliance with States obligations in international law, including IHL, which holds firmly that wounded 
and civilians should have access to both medical and humanitarian aid the emphasis is on the 
prohibition of facilitating terrorism, rather than the provision of medical or humanitarian aid.  
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It is interesting to look at Somalia, which, although lacks domestic counterterrorist laws, has been 
negatively affected by the international counterterrorist framework and its sanctions against al Shabaab. 
For example, in 2008 when the US blacklisted al Shabab, US AID stopped all new funding. By 2010 
this had a chilling effect and impeded adequate funding to respond to the 2010 famine. 175  In response, 
the UN had to put a specific exemption in order to ensure that people in need would receive aid: 
[Operative paragraph 48] Decides that until 15 November 2019 and without prejudice 
to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed 
by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other 
financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of 
urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its 
specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer 
status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, 
and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-
governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian 
Response Plan for Somalia.176 
This is one of the only examples where the UN tried to unequivocally instructed states to make an 
exemption. Normally, the UNSCR do not include explicit exemptions in their resolutions, which can 
have an adverse effect in how State’s implement the resolutions in their domestic legislations.177   
 
In practice, these international provisions and subsequent domestic counterterrorist laws undermine 
these principles. For instance, Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF/Doctors Without Borders) confirmed 
that ‘[i]t is indeed the intersection of IHL and domestic criminal and counterterrorist legislation that we 
are encountering the greatest difficulty in securing the neutrality and safety of the medical mission and 
the protection of our staff and patients.’178 This was made clear in a recently published report that found 
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out of 16 countries surveyed ’10 countries appear to suggest that the authorities interpret support to 
terrorism to include the provision of healthcare […] what is new is not the criminalization of healthcare 
per se, but how the counterterrorism framework has purportedly strengthened the legal and moral basis 
to justify such actions.’179 For instance, in both Iraq and Nigeria during the conflict doctors have been 
arrested for providing care to the NSAG.180 This in spite of IHL prohibition and protection of medical aid, 
however, in these cases where there is a NIAC domestic legislation plays an important role. Moreover, 
the counterterrorist legislations are left to State’s interpretation and there is no legally binding document 
that authoritatively instructs the interaction between international law and counterterrorist legislation, as 
discussed above, both could be interpreted as the lex specialis.181 Only a few countries in addition to 
the EU Directive explicitly make an exception in their counterterrorist legislations to medical and 
humanitarian relief. 182 As with the exclusion clause, this exception should be clearly elucidated in 
domestic legislations and in UNSCR. The UN has included in its Global Counterterrorism Strategy a 
provision that laws should not ‘impede humanitarian and medical activities.’183 However, it is not clear 
if all the UN organs that work on counterterrorism encourage the respect for IHL while developing their 
policies and guiding States in implementing the binding UNSCR resolutions.184 
 
In a similar way, the proliferation of broad counterterrorist laws has had an adverse impact on the 
provision of neutral and impartial humanitarian aid to populations affected by the conflict. The 
counterterrorist legislations responsible are ones that criminalise giving material support, financial 
assistance, etc. to terrorist organisations. Increasingly organisations are required to respond to donor 
requirements to show that sufficient risk assessment has been taken in order to not be implicated for 
providing aid to a designated terrorist organization. There have been cases when donors have 
suspended funding after allegations of aid diversion, for example, a programme run by World Vision in 
                                                 
179 Marina Buissonniere, Sarah Wozniak and Leonard Rubenstein ‘The Criminalization of Healthcare’ 
(June 2018) available < https://www1.essex.ac.uk/hrc/documents/54198-criminalization-of-healthcare-
web.pdf> accessed 29 August 2019, 18.  
180 Ibid 19.  
181 Saul ‘Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism…’ (n 20) 8 – 9 
182 Weizman (n 174). 
183 Weizman (n 174).  
184 As opposed to non-binding ones like UNSCR 2286 urging states to comply with IHL including the 
protection of the medical mission. Alice Debarre ‘Safeguarding Medical Care and Humanitarian 
Action’ (September 2018) International Peace Institute available <www.ipinst.org> accessed 04 
September 2019.  3.  
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Palestine.185  The reporting may be burdensome especially for smaller NGOs, and as a result, 
organisations may limit their own engagement with communities, which may put in question a neutral 
and impartial approach because actions will not be based on the needs of the population rather on 
mitigating own risks.186 Usually, the population who are most at need are the ones who are caught in 
between the government and the opposing forces and neutral space is difficult to maintain even without 
more pressures put on the organisations by either side.  
 
On top of the donor requirements, organisations also have to confront host governments who may use 
counterterrorist rhetoric or laws to influence where they can or cannot work. For example, in Nigeria the 
military banned UNICEF from working accusing it for spying for Boko Haram.187 In general, 
organisations have had a hard time working in Nigeria because the government restricts them from 
working in certain areas and therefore their programmes potentially exclude those most in need.188 
Organisations working in Iraq were not allowed by the government to work in ISIS areas or in special 
cases needed specific permission. This meant that aid was concentrated in certain areas, while absent 
in others and therefore again not implemented based on impartial humanitarian needs.189 This can also 
feed into the polarisation of the conflict and the division, stigmatisation and further separation of people. 
 
This section has illustrated how both medical and humanitarian aid, which are protected by IHL, are 
currently challenged by the international and domestic counterterrorist framework. This can be 
remedied with clear exemptions to medical and humanitarian aid in the UNSCR provisions and 
instructions to States to make adequate distinctions and exemption. This, however, would still need to 
be detached from the terrorist label, which delegitimises and therefore stigmatises to the extent that 
those accused of terrorism find themselves outside of the legal system . IHL is better suited for conflict 
situations and it envisages protection for those who are not, or are no longer fighting without making a 
distinction.  
                                                 
185 Ibid 17.  
186 NRC (n 175) available <https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/principles-under-pressure/1nrc-
principles_under_pressure-report-screen.pdf> accessed 04 September 2019. 16.  
187 Yomi Kazeem ‘Nigeria’s army is accusing international bodies of working with Boko Haram and 
undermining soldiers’ (Quartz Africa, December 17, 2018) available < 
https://qz.com/africa/1498149/nigerian-army-says-unicef-amnesty-intl-aid-boko-haram/> accessed 01 
September 2019.  
188 NRC (n 175) 21.  
189 Duplat (m 177) 139. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to show that the internationally disputed term of terrorism and the 
international counterterrorist framework, with the proliferation of domestic legislation, has challenged 
IHL particularly in NIAC. The threat of terrorist acts in times of peace is undeniably real and States are 
confronted with a difficult challenge in trying to prevent, suppress and ultimately punish those who 
commit abhorrent violations of human rights and humanitarian law. It is questionable, however, if the 
focus on outlawing ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ is possible given the ambiguity and broadness of the terms, 
and how the absence of specificity in law is then open to interpretations by the courts as well as the 
public. Given the international counterterrorist framework, and its accompanying bureaucracy, there is 
a question if it is too late to come to a common definition, or if precisely because of this, the international 
community has no choice but to define terrorism. Underlying the divergent opinions on terrorism is the 
question of legitimacy. On the one hand, there are those who do not think that anyone outside of the 
democratic state has the right to use force. On the other hand, there are those who want to ensure that 
struggles for national liberation will not be labelled terrorist, a term that is derogatory and indeed seeps 
the legitimacy out of any fight.  
 
Although, the counter terrorist framework was intended to apply during times of peace, the violence of 
terrorism and that of war are increasingly being blurred. As such, the international community needs to, 
in the least, authoritatively clarify the relationship of the counterterrorist framework to other international 
normative frameworks, namely IHL. This has been done in some conventions and domestic laws, but 
they are in few and not consistently applied. Contemporary conflicts are non-international, yet 
increasingly internationalised, armed conflicts in which the State is able to criminalise mere participation 
in a NSAG. This criminalisation now falls under domestic counterterrorist legislations which have broad 
interpretations of who is a terrorist and target not only NSAG members, but anyone who is associated 
or provides material support. This results in harsh punishment of anyone who can conveniently be made 
to fit the loose-fitting terms. It also results in impunity for war crimes and other serious violations as 
‘terrorists’ are punished for who they are and not what they have done.  
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The separation of the two is imperative in order to safeguard the humanitarian space that IHL has 
constructed and preserved. IHL makes a distinction between the different types of violence with its 
underlying logic embedded in the unfortunate reality that there will always be struggles. For this reason, 
it advocates that while they are ongoing there should be a space for preserving humanity, in the way 
that they are fought and, and in the way, that those who are not or no longer participating are treated. 
IHL is clear in prohibiting and punishing those who do not follow the rules, but for this the rules must be 
known and this space maintained even when threatened by atrocious violence. There is a larger 
question of how IHL can be reinforced in NIAC without eroding principles, but enforcing the protections 
of those who do not, or no longer take part in hostilities. The counterterrorist logic of blindly outlawing 
any violence and criminalising anyone who may be associated, does not make a distinction on the 
context and the acts, and focuses itself solely on who has the legitimacy. Ultimately, this challenges the 
application of IHL and the preservation of humanitarian space in situations that rise to the level of a 
conflict. And, this in the long run has an adverse impact on peace and reconciliation.  
 
There is a question of the internationalisation of conflicts and how it ties into the above discussion, not 
adequately covered in this paper, but an important factor that needs to be considered because 
‘international problems need international solutions.’  Framing the terrorist threat as international and 
then outsourcing them to domestic counterterrorist legislation may give the appearance of providing 
solutions, however, as the above discussion shows this has created a multitude of unintended 
consequences that will sooner or later need to be addressed in the interest of peace and security.  
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